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Abstract. Ransomware has become a significant problem and its impact is
getting worse. It has now become a lucrative business as it is being offered as a
service. Unlike other security issues, the effect of ransomware is irreversible and
difficult to stop. This research has analysed existing ransomware classifications
and its detection and prevention methods. Due to the difficulty in categorizing
the steps none of the existing methods can stop ransomware. Ransomware
families are identified and classified from the year 1989 to 2017 and surprisingly
there are not much difference in the pattern. This paper concludes with a brief
discussion about the findings and future work of this research.
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1 Background
Ransomware, also known as crypto virus, has received significant attention among
cyberspace researchers in the last few years. Intruders use these malwares to steal
people’s private information with the help of vulnerabilities, including previous mal-
ware attacks, and threaten the victim to agree to their demand or they will lose their
valuable files, data or private information. The ransom or demand may be e-gold,
cryptocurrency or demands to purchase from designated stores. Ransomware is not a
new concept, the first ransomware appeared in 1989 named as the PC CYBORG
(AIDS) Trojan. It was delivered electronically through a floppy disk and the floppy disk
was then used to attack a system [2]. Modern ransomware attacks started in 2005 with
“Trojan.Gpcoder”.
A malware is considered ransomware only if a minimum of three anti-virus vendors
have assigned malware labels and categorised it as ransomware. The ransomware and
malware can be differentiated by their attacking behaviour [1] and time taken for the
attack. Malware attempts to hide behind applications, but ransomware initiates an attack
immediately after installation. Ransomware is created for direct revenue generation, it
often uses a countdown clock to alert the victim about the remaining time for paying the
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ransom. The first ransomwares displayed advertisements, but advancements in malware
made it possible to block services, disable keyboards and spy on user activities [3].
During a ransomware attack, attackers use system vulnerabilities to intrude into the
compromised device. The attacking probability of already attacked devices is always
high. In most cases, major ransomware attacks occur on windows machines, but they
can also attack android, Linux and IOS devices [4]. The ACSC 2015 Threat Report
states that ransomware campaigns against Australian organizations will continue to be
prominent. Every sector experienced a cyber security incident, which demonstrates the
indiscriminate targeting and the sophistication of this type of threat. The number of
ransomware incidents has drastically increased and is now four times higher than
recorded in 2013. In 2015 the FBI received around 992 complaints regarding ran-
somware with the victims losing an estimated $18 billion.
Existing research’s [13, 14, 21, 23] indicates that attacks of ransomware are difficult
to detect or stop from occurring. The scope of this research is to understand operation
of ransomware within Microsoft Windows operating systems by analysing the five-
stages of operation of ransomware. In the next section, the evolution of ransomware
and how the ransomware operates within a device is discussed. Section three of this
paper will discuss the three families of ransomware and the five stages of the attack
process. Section four discusses the evolution of ransomware and section four will
elucidate the different ransomware detection methods. The last section will conclude
with findings obtained from this study and recommendations for future work.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Review Stage
The main motive of introducing ransomware into the cyber world was to obtain
financial gain by threatening people. There is no connection between the ransomware
and the victims, but previous research shows that people who browse through
unwanted websites are vulnerable to ransomware attack. The ransomwares can apply
any kind of infection method that the malwares can use [5, 6, 21]. Ransomwares could
be broadly classified as follows (Fig. 1) and the scope of this research is highlighted.
Scareware: This is a threat which takes advantage of people’s fear. It is also known as
rouge security software and was initially not considered a member of ransomware
family. However, the increasing level of popularity of this malware has led to the
classification of scareware within the family of ransomware. The scareware shows a
message which states that the virus attacked the victim’s system and it attempts to
convince the victim to buy antivirus software which should remove the virus. Usually,
these viruses are fake, and the antivirus software is non-functional malware [1, 8].
Lock Screen Ransomware: The lock screen ransomwares lock the victim’s system
until a ransom is paid for the lock key to retrieve it. It generally locks the desktop of a
victim and creates a new window [9] which is used to communicate with the victim.
The command and control server then control the victim’s system and the new window
shows messages about the ransomware threat and possible ways to unlock the system.
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Crypto Ransomware: The most dangerous ransomware family is the crypto ran-
somware family. The ransomware encrypts the victim’s files using strong encryption
algorithms. In most cases cyber criminals make their own crypto systems. It is very
difficult to retrieve the data back if the ransom is not paid within the period. CRYP-
TOLOCKER [10] is an example for the crypto ransomware which encrypts user files
using a private encryption key.
However, the main advantage of this ransomware is that it stores the private key
within the victim’s system, so that further analysis can be used to access this private
encryption key and retrieve the data. Reveton, otherwise also called Trojan:
W32/Reveton, is an example of scareware which appeared to take control of the
infected machine until the victim accepted the demand [20]. Using the RSA-2048
algorithm, file encryption ransomware encrypts the victim’s documents and displays a
message demanding money on the screen of the attacked device. In addition, it will also
create a new instance of EXPLORER.EXE AND SVCHOST.EXE to make commu-
nication with the command and control server of the criminals [19]. Once the instal-
lation has occurred, the crypto wall will start to delete the shadow copies of files and
install spyware to steal passwords saved on the victim’s device as well as bitcoin
wallets [22]. No machine is free from ransomware attack; mobile devices are vulner-
able too. Fake messages imitating legitimate sources, which offers gifts and vouchers
traps people to download ransomware executables. The latest and most effective
Wannacry ransomware appeared in 2017 [18] and targeted Microsoft Windows oper-
ating systems. A ransomware attack of a system is generally defined five stages [11],














Fig. 1. Ransomware taxonomy [21]
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2.2 Installation
The installation sets up the ransomware in victim’s system and creates an environment
to work in. Most ransomware hide behind the root path of the AppData or in the local
AppData folder. During the installation execution, it randomly creates a file name
inside the AppData folder [7]. Prior to that it will delete the original executable files
available in the system. After creating the new file, it will then update the registry key
files, containing information about tuning parameters, system configurations and user
preferences, with the new registers on the device.
The modification of registry key files is done to obtain persistence of the device
unless it reboots. Such persistence is obtained by executing an auto run process of
registry keys that enables the malware to perform their execution while the device runs
in a safe mode. Finally, to delete the shadow copies, the ransomware hijacks most of
the executable files of that specific device.
2.3 Communication
For a complete ransomware attack, the ransomware needs to contact a command and
control server. One possible way to establish the connection between the victim’s
device and command and control server is through a TOR network. After the instal-
lation of the ransomware file, the device will communicate with the command and
control server to obtain the encryption key. Then using this encryption key, the ran-
somware will encrypt the selected files on the victim’s device. To initiate the process,
a communication setup has to be executed on the victim device to begin the com-
munication between the command and communication server and the victim’s device.
Fig. 2. Five stage process of Ransomware
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Then a domain is hosted to reach out the ransomwares by a Domain Generating
Algorithm (DGA) [7]. These algorithms can generate a list of pseudo random domain
names and are able to create thousands of command and control domains on a daily
basis. The main advantage to the attackers of creating such domains is that they are
very difficult to be shut down.
2.4 File Search and Encryption Process
Encryption is the major process for the crypto ransomware. For the encryption pro-
cedure, the server needs to generate an encryption key between the victim’s computer
and the command and control server. This differs in symmetric and asymmetric
encryption, where in the symmetric encryption the same secret key is used for both
encryption and decryption. In asymmetric encryption, a private key known only by the
owner is used as well as a public key. The encryption method uses the public key and
the decryption method uses the private key. The keys are protected using different
methods [10]. The public key is embedded into the ransomware or obtained from the
command and control server and it is then used to encrypt the symmetric key. After
encryption, the key is stored in the infected system [12]. After obtaining the encryption
key, the encryption procedure begins. The sender encrypts the plain text using the
public key and on the receiver side the text is decrypted using the private key. The files
are encrypted using the server generated encryption key and removes the original file.
The encryption method is used to secure the communication channel between the
ransomware and the command and control server. The dual encryption method is used
because of performance and convenience. In some processes the ransomware uses
individual keys per file [8], so breaking that key would only give access to that file.
After initiation, the ransomware will create an encrypted copy of the original file and
attempts to destroy all copies of the original ones. It renames the encrypted copy with
the original file name with some extensions added.
2.5 Extortion
In the final stage, a ransom is demanded and displayed on victim’s system [6]. There
will be a time limit to pay the ransom before the criminals destroy the decryption key.
They might use different payment methods for ransom payment. Certain ransomware
will allow you to decrypt one file for free to assure you that the key is valid on your
device. One type of payment is through Bitcoins, which may be an anonymous pay-
ment. More recent ransomware proceeds to delete files to threaten you in paying the
ransom quickly. But there is no guarantee that the key they provided will help you to
decrypt your files. There are ways in which the time for paying is set in the victim’s
device. The CMOS can be used as countdown for payment so that even if the user goes
offline it will monitor the time limit. The ransom often increases automatically after a
given time limit for the payment and updates this with the command and control server.
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3 Ransomware Evolution and Detection Methods
The attack of ransomware is not new, and the first ransomware attack occurred in 1989
by ransomware named “PC cyborg”, which belongs to the crypto ransomware family.
The next major attack occurred five years later in 1994 by the ransomware named the
OneHalf virus. In 2004, the “GP coder” marked the beginning of the crypto
ransomware attack era. From 2011 to 2013. RansomLock however, was from the so-
called locky ransomware family. The attack rate of ransomware steadily increased in
the following years. In 2014, Bucbi, TorrentLocker, CryptoWall, CryptoDefence,
Cryakl, Reactor, CTB-Locker, CryptoGraphiLocker, Cryptowall2, CryFile, KetBTC,
BandarChor, Virlock, KEYHolder and Operation Global 3 appeared. In 2015 thirty-
five ransomwares appeared. The major ransomware attacks occurred in 2015, 2016 and
2017 as illustrated in Fig. 3 below. Ransomware attacks and the evolution of new
ransomware families have increased due to the success of ransomware attacks.
Fig. 3. Ransomware timeline
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3.1 Study of Existing Methods
In the UNVEIL method [13], researchers analysed and detected ransomware attacks
and modelled the behaviour using a dynamic analysis methods. To monitor how the
ransomware interacts, an artificial but realistic execution environment is used which is
created by the system automatically [13]. Then the interaction process with the file
system is closely monitored to precisely characterize the cryptographic behaviour of the
ransomware. The UNVEIL method flags suspicious behaviour as “like ransomware”
and the operation of the ransomware is then identified to differentiate different classes
of ransomware. UNVEIL uses two steps: the first step is to generate a user environment
and the second step is to monitor file system activity [13]. Wecksten et al. [14] analysed
four crypto ransomwares in a virtual machine with a Windows 7 operating system. For
the investigation, the Cryptowall, Tesla Crypt, CTB Locker and Locky ransomware
were used and the infection has been analysed using zeltzers [14]. In addition, the
researchers used the software process monitor and regshots for tracking the process
activity, file system activity and registry manipulation. This experiment identified that
the crypto ransomware attacks are dependent on software named vssadmin.exe in the
victim’s device [14]. They claim that the attack can be easily prevented by avoiding
access to the vssadmin.exe software. The remaining experiment was conducted by
renaming the vssadmin.exe with shadow copies being created. Because of this pre-
vention method, the ransomware could not find the restore point which was created
before infection and that made it possible to restore all the information [14]. Moore [15]
tried to detect the ransomware using a honeypot folder. The honeypot folder is created
to monitor the changes occurring in the folder [15]. In addition, the Microsoft File
Server Resource Manager feature was used for the file screening service and the Event
Sentry was used to manipulate the Windows security logs [15]. This alert can then
assist the system administrator to prevent further damage to the system [15].
The main aim was to determine a suitable ransomware detection method and to
deploy an additional layer of security to the network to protect network actions rather
than shutting down a server for the user when trying to update a file. When the first
detection of a change has been encountered, a trigger would occur [15]. This was used
to look for the email that caused the change in the monitored folder. If more activity
was then encountered, the second hierarchical level was triggered. In the third hier-
archical stage, the intensity of activity results in terminating the network service [15].
And finally, the fourth stage occurs when a final threshold of changes has been
encountered. At this point, alerting the administrator and blocking the users access was
not enough to stop the spread of damages, and therefore the ultimate protection would
be to shut down the server [15].
Scaife et al. [16] present an early detection system, CryptoDrop, to alert a user
during suspicious file activity. It can halt a process that appears to be tampering with a
large amount of the data using a set a of behaviour indicators. Then the system can be
parameterized for rapid detection with low false positives by combining a set of
indicators common to the ransomware [16]. This research indicated that careful anal-
ysis of the behaviour of ransomware can detect it and can mitigate significant loss of
data. By doing so, an early warning system has been created that can detect the
malicious program through monitoring of the user’s data [16]. Each ransomware uses
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their own algorithm to perform these specific activities. The character of ransomware
can be divided into three classes [16]. The first class includes the generic behaviour of
ransomware. The renaming behaviour can also be added within this class. In the second
class, the ransomware moves the files out of the user’s documents directory, then it
reads the contents within the file, writes the encrypted contents for each file, and moves
the file back to the directory [16]. Renaming can also occur with this second class of
ransomware, i.e. when the files are moved back into the directory, the name of the file
may be different. The third class of ransomware reads the original file to create a new
independent file containing the encrypted contents. It then deletes or overwrites the
original file and its shadow copies [16]. For the analysis, a set of data was built
representative of measured user document directories. The distribution of file types
over the entire file system and document directories was examined. A document corpus
of 5099 files with 511 total directories was constructed [16]. Data was then randomly
selected from different data sets and placed in different directories. For placing the
directory tree, a user’s document folder was placed in a cuckoo sandbox running on a
Windows 7 machine. The amount of data loss was used as metric to detect the ran-
somware attack [16]. By detecting the attack early, further attacks were controlled, and
the remaining unaffected data was saved. Also, the frequency of file format attacks was
calculated. The results showed that ransomware preferred to attack productivity files
rather than the media files such as pictures and music [16].
3.2 Evaluation of Existing Methods
Using the UNVEIL method [13], attackers can easily identify the automatically gen-
erated user environments and this approach will make it easier for the ransomware to
hook with the documents and specific operations in the operating system. Also, most of
the ransomware will never encrypt the files in the same locations. The ransomwares
will try to shuffle the files and will change the master file system. By making the file
unreadable, changing the file names and extensions, it is very difficult for the victim to
identify which files are encrypted. The ransomwares can also lock the monitor and will
take the rights from the victim. Clearly, it is not possible to analyse and stop the
ransomware using file system activity. The novel method described in [14] is only
effective when it repairs the damaged structure. The local hard drive would be unusable
or permanently damaged at file system level. And the researchers also declared in this
article that the presented solution might not be the most suitable one. They highly
recommended implementing a proper backup at regular intervals to save all the
information in another place.
The honey pot technique [15] can be used to detect a ransomware attack, however
this method only focusses on the honeypot folders. In the early detection method
[16, 23], the high latency creates an operation so that the file is often locked and cannot
be opened by the ransomware. So, the possibility of saving the data files from further
attack is also reduced using this technique. Table 1 presents the ransomware detection
of the reviewed methodologies over the processing of ransomware. Various approaches
have been used to detect ransomware attacks, however there is no method detected all
stages. Table 1 represents the ransomware detection of the reviewed methodologies
over the processing of ransomware. All these methodologies are focused on
A Review of Ransomware Families and Detection Methods 595
ransomware detection based at system file level. Monitoring changes from file levels
has significant disadvantages. The ransomware attack process is going through five
different stages and the file encryption process starts in the fourth stage. So, further
investigation is required to identify the best solution that meets the requirements such
as identifying the ransomware attacks from its previous stages.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
Ransomware attacks will continue to increase because of the increased use of the
Internet. In this paper, three different families of ransomware and five-stages of
operation of the ransomware are identified. Section three portraits the evolution of
ransomware by showing the time line from 1989 to 2017. The monitoring of ran-
somware processes and operating systems activity is an effective method to find
solutions for ransomware attacks. But from the evaluation of the existing methods we
can conclude that none attempt to detect or stop the ransomware in the initial two
stages. Detection at a later stage will increase the impact of ransomware attack, so that a
solution to detect ransomware from its initial two stages is desirable to reduce the
impact of ransomware. Future work of this research focuses on closely monitoring each
stage of live ransomwares which attack Microsoft Windows operating systems in a
controlled test environment. By allowing the ransomware to attack a device we can
identify the ransomware processes, how it attacks operating system and finally the
impact of the ransomware attack.
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